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Introduction
Before March 1979, monetary cooperation in the Community
was organized un.der the relevant provisions of the Treaty and by
Council decisions. But the introduction of the European Monetary
System meant a new dimension and a new approach, with the expli-
cit purpose, clearly stated from the outset, of establishing
closer monetary cooperAtion l~ading to a zone of monetary sta-
bility in Europe . indeed, the EMS has been so important to the
history of monetary cooperation in Europe that, since March
1979, the two are coterminous, and a review of one is necessari-
ly a review of the other.
This report is a review of the EMS. It begins by analys-
ing the system s contribution to the convergence on which stabi-
li ty depends, i. e. by assessing the degree of convergence
achieved through the workings of the EMS and by describing its
results.
It then considers how the EMS mechanisms have ensured
orderly exchange management, by seeking to analyse their adequa-
cy and assessing their scope.
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I. THE EMS, INSTRUMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY CONVERGENCE
The success of the EMS should be measured in terms of
the two-fold purpose assigned it : its ability, on the one hand
to induce a greater degree of economic policy convergence and
on the other, to achieve stability in the monetary variables.
A .  Convergence induced by the EMS
a)  The EMS has given substance to Communi tY 1'll0ni toring
procedures
The introduction of the EMS did not lead to any official
change or extension in the monitoring procedures gradually set
up in the Community oVer the previous decade. But it did act as
a powerful incentive to revive existing procedures and exploit
them in pursuit of a coherent project.
During the 1970s, it became apparent that community mo-
nitoring and coordination was in some ways a failure. That fail-
ure was, indeed, one of the main re.asons why the first attempts
to introduce a stable exchange-rate system in the Community (the
.. Snake ) did not work out very well. Faced with a seriously dis-
turbed international environment where fixed exchange relations
had been abandoned and oil prices were soaring, the member coun-
tries sometimes opted for economic policy choices which were
fundamentally different, no one being really prepared to submit
to an exchange-rate constraint if that entailed sacrificing .
domestic aim.
Th~ EMS was set up as a result of a defensive reaction
against the disorderly movements of the dollar and against the
danger of economic deterioration in the Community if uncoordi-
ated behaviour continued. AfJ th,e system came into operation,
the soundness of this reaction gradually became more apparent.
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- Attitudes converged on recognizing that the main thrust of na-
tional economic policies should be directed towards achieving
price stabilization, and that the level to be desired was that
of th~ moat successful performer on this front. Th~s was the
approach that in fact prevailed in response to the second oil
shock.
- Concertation in community bodies is now active and systema-
tic. The constraints imposed by EMS rules have given a con-
crete and effective chAracter to the regular examinations of
economic and monetary policies by the Committee of Governors
and the Monetary Committee.
- Disciplinary effects h.ve resulted from the internal pressures
generated by the system. Realignments now provide a privileged
opportuni ty for a thorough 6~ami nination of national economic
policies. Although this practic~ is not explicitly provided
for in the rules governing the EMS, it has become usual since
the realignment of February 1982. Earlier realignments had
been essentially technical operations, changes in par values
since then have been accompanied by back-up programmes in the
countries requesting a devaluation of their currencies. In an
inflationary environment, this method , although not symmetric-
al, is consistent with the aim of stability.
b) However, convergence is still limited
Some progress has bean made towards convergence, espe-
cially in the past two years 1 but not, so far, enough, and not
sufficiently solid. The EMS has, it is true, made for closer co-
operation between participants in specific monetary policy
areas; but the member States remain almost entirely free, and
domestic reasons can lead them to deviate from the line most
consistent with common objectives~
tes,
The adjustment experiences of the different member Sta-
in response to the two oi 1 shocks and the course of the
dollar, have shown that convergence is primarily a result of the
political will of governments to undertake the appropri.te poli-
cies. In this, the EMS participants have been sustained by the
discipline which an oexchange rate obligation implies.
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To comply with the requirements of EMS mechanisms, the
participants have been obliged to adopt more closely concerted
monetary policies. Moreover, pursuant to the declared aim of in-
ternal and external stabilization, quantified money supply or
credit expansion targets have been defined in terms of a gradual
reduction in monetary growth rates in most of the member Sta..
tes. Closer cooperation and tighter monetary discipline have
raised effective defences against pressures on e~change rates
and prices. But the pursuit of convergent quantitative aims has
not, on its own, sufficed to guArantee lasting stability in the
EMS. Compatibility between monetary policies on the one hand and
exchange-rate objectives on the other depends on a complex set
of interrelations that are in turn determined by the degree of
openness of the economy concerned, the way in which the money
supply growth target is met (excessive e~pansion of bank credit
accompanied by capital outflows can have a similar effect on mO-
netary creation to that of controlled domestic credit expan-
sion), and ~specially the general stance af economic policy and
the expectations it creates. From this poi.nt of view, the per-
sistence of sizeable budget deficits and the inability to keep
the nominal trends of incomes and costs sufficiently under con-
trol has made it mo.re difficult to maintain a restrictive mone-
tary policy stance.
The influence of the EMS on means of action not directly
within the scope of monetary policy has been only intermittent,
and generally , delayed, two factors in particular contribute to
weakening the impetus of general adjustment policies towards
convergence.
- First, several member States have maintained restrictions on
the free circulation of capital, these restrictions hamper the
dissemination to the rest of the Community of effects induced
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by national monetary and economic policies, and consequently
reduce the scope of monetary cooperation, even if they only
delay the ~mergence of pressures on exchange r.tes.
- Secondly, the opportunities and facilities for unconditional
borrowing on international markets available to member States
have rendered resort at an early stage to the short-term and
medium-term borrowing facilities provided under the system un-
necessary . Since the EMS became operative, only the community
loan mechanism (which is in any case outside the system) has
been called upon. Thus the cap.acity of the EMS credit facili-
ties to promote convergence has not been exploited, and conse-
quently the opportunities they afford to facilitate adjustment
programmes have not been availed of.
B. Results on the stability front
a)  The system has made a positive contribution to e~change-
rate stability
Despi te the instability of the international monetary
environment, the EMS has managed to reduce the volatility of ex-
change-rate relAt~ons between the participating currencies and
to impose order on their 1I10vement
S expected, the requirement to maintain exchange rates
within a narrOw band has meant much more stability in the short
run. Between 1979 and 1983, the average changes from one month
to the next in the exchange rates of the other EMS currencies
against the mark (taken as the standard reference currency)
ranged from  % to 0, 8 %; those of the three major non-parti-
cipating currencies, the dollar, the yen and sterling, were
three times as wide : between 2,4 % and 2, 7 %. The average rate
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of change against the mark of the French franc and the lira,
which floated freely before joining the EMS, was reduced by more
than half after 1979, in relation to 1974-78 : for the French
franc, it fell from 1, ' to 0,8 " for the lira, from 2, ' to
8 \.
As intra-community trade is a major component of the
member countries ' foreign trade, more stable exchange relations
between the EMS participant currencies have meant, on the whole,
more stable effective exchange rates (the effective exchange
rate is the average rate of e~change weighted for the composi-
tion of the global foreign trade of the country concerned). Ave-
rage changes from one month to the ne~t in the effective exchan-
ge rates of the EMS currencies ranged .from 1, 2 % to 1, 5 % be-
tween 1979 and 1983, much lower than the range of 1, 3 % to 2 ,
for the same currencies from 1974 to 1979, or the range of 2,3 ,
to 2, 8 % for the major non-participants (the dollar, the yen and
sterling) since the introduction of the EMS.
There have been seven realignments since the EMS was in-
troduced. That they should be so frequently required illustrates
the limitations to medium-term stability in exchange rates be-
tween the currencies of economies where inflation rates and ba-
lance-of-payments performances diverge. On each occasion, how-
ever, the par value changes were consistent with the development
of fundamental economic factors, and prevented erratic fluctua-
tions of real exchange rates (i. e. effective exchange rates ad-
justed for the inflation differential between the country con-
cerned and its trade partner.s). From 1979 to 1983, the maximum
deviation from medium-term underlying trends of the real exchan-
ge rate against the other EMS currencies of the mark, the French
franc, the Italian lira and the Irish pound was only about half
as large as that recorded during the previous five-year period.
Indeed, the rates of all the participating currencies againpt a I ""
set of major currencies deviated much less from the real
exchange-rate trend (with deviations ranging. from 8, 2 , to
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13, 1 %) than did those of the major non-participants (with 16,
for the dollar, over 29 % for the yen and over 41 % for sterl-
ing). There is no doubt that the orderly management of exchange
relation.s prevented protectionist reactions that might otherwise
have emerged in response to marked fluctuations in rates or com-
petitive depreciation.
b) Price convergence : mixed results
Over the five-year period, achievements on the inflation
front have been modest. Average inflation in the Community in
terms of the consumer price index: declined by 2, 7 points, from
9 % in 1979 to 6, 2 % in 1983. Taking the countries actually
participating in the EMS, the average inflation rat~ declined by
slightly less than 2 points from a lower initial level : 8 % in
1979, to 6, 1 % in 1983. The trend of inflation is expected to
continue to s low down in 1984 to 5, 2 % on average for the Commu-
ni ty and to 5 % for the countries participating in the ex-
change-rate mechanism of the EMS. Price trend differentials be-
tween community countries narrowed only slightly over the five
years (the mean absolute deviation fell from 4, 3 percentage
points in 1979 to 3, 9 in 1983), and not at all (mean absolute
deviation : 4, 2 points in 1979, 4, 4 in 1983) if the participants
in the e~change-rate mechanism alone are considered. Substantial
progress in reducing these differentials is, however, expected
in 1984, when the mean absolute deviation should be down to 2,
points in the Community and 2,7 points for the participants in
the exchange-rate mechanism.
.../...8" -
The five-year period can be subdivided into two broad
stages 1 considering in particular the price trends in the EMS
participants, we note that
- for the first two years of the EMS, the average rate of price
rise in the area was gathering momentum1 it reached 10,3 '
1980, at the same time, inflation rate differentials were wi-
dening 
- subsequently, inflation rates began to converge on a gradually
declining path, especially from 1982.
Internal factors, but also the influence of the interna-
tional environment, help explain these developments.
From the internal point of view, and allowing for the
divergences accumulated, there was no prospect of achieving sta-
bilization in all the countries within the same time span.
France, Italy and Ireland joined the EMS with their currencies
in a favourable relative position in terms of their real ex-
change rate, while the real exchange rates of the snake curren-
cies were fairly high. In the first stage, inflation differen-
tials could thus develop before the exchange-rate constraint
became fully operative. As subsequent realignments only partial-
ly offset these differentials, the system gradually came to
exercise discipline towards stability. In the second stage, that
discipli.ne became more deliberate and resulted in particular in
remarkable convergence between monetary policy stances and re-
adjusted economic and fiscal policies.
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The ~mpAct of the two oil shocks on the ~ndustrialized
economies was broadly similar  on each occasion, it corresponded
a cut of about 2 % of GDP in the OECD countries. But the
inflationary impact of the second oil shock on the EMS countries
was much more successfully countered than that experienced in
1974. The average inflation rate in the countries that are now
in the EMS soared from 6,3 % in 1972 to 12, 9 % in 1974; the
acceleration was less pronounced in 1980, when the rate reached
10, 2 % compared with 6, 7 % in 1978. The dollar was the cause of
another external shock : its exchange rate against the ecu has
appreciated by around 70 % since 1979. ~he rise in the dollar
has fuelled inflationary pressures in the countries where prices
were difficult to control, while high US interest rates had
varying impacts cn member States ' current balance positions.
However, the steady rise in the dollar has also helped to ensure
stable ~xchange relations within th~ EMS by exercis ing downwArd
pressure on the effective exchange rate of the system' s major
currency - a particularly useful contribution during the period
when the notion and practice of convergence were gradually
taking shape.
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II. ' THE EMS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ORDERLY EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT
The stabilization of exchange relations between the EMS
currencies has been achieved not only thanks to the policies .nd
behaviour adopted as a result of the introduction of the system,
but also to the ~~tual working of the system ~tself. T~e EMS
will be examined from the point of view of its daily funct~oning
and in the li ght of the Resolutions of the European Counci Is of
Bremen and Brussels and th~ provi siGns of the agreement of 
MArch 1979 b~tween the central banks of the .ember states. The
examination will be conducted from the two-fol~ standpoint of
the use made of the EMS mechanisms - how well they fulfil their
purpose - and of their scope - which fields they cover.
A.  How well the mechanisms fulfil their purpose
a) The use of the ecu
The ecus rec~ived by central banks in exchange for gold
and dollar contributions are not put to extensive use. As an
asset , they are precarious, on the one hand , because they are
created by means of a temporary swap .ystem with no indication
as to what may happen after the transitional stage, and, on the
other, because the volume in existence is unstable given that 
depends on volatile variables : the price of gold and the ex-
change-rate of the dollar. Their attractiveness as an asset 
further circumscribed by their limited acceptability (creditors
are under no obli9ation to accept ecus except in settlement of .
claim maturing under the very short-term financing facility and
only up to 50 , of that cla~m) 1 accumulated creditor positions
in ~cu are not convert~ble; and the yield is low (being an aver-
age of off ictal discount rates). For all these reasons, ecus are
only used on a small scale even in cases where debtors are ex-
plicitly entitled to do so. A new type of operation has, never-
theless, been introduced with swaps between ecus and national
currencies being utilised in order to mobilise available ecus.
In practice , however, the ecu is considered not so much a reser-
ve asset as a means of credit that wi II eventually have to be
settled using other assets.
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From 1979 to 19B3, about 80 % of very .short-term financ-
ing operations were unwound without recourse to th~ ecu through
offsetting or advance repayments wi th credi tor currencies. The
cumulativ~ amount of settlements in ecu is in the order of 2 000
million ecu over the whole period. This figure compares with 
total ecu stock of 53 000 million at end-19B3 ~ Voluntar~ trans-
actions have resulted in net repurchases of ecu, which ~s also
indicative of central banks ' efforts to hold down the level of
net ecu balances.
b) Exchange-rate mechanism and intervention
Intra-marginal interventions, carried out before the
compulsory intervention limits are reached, have accounted for
four fifths of total interventions by EMS central banks.
When the orLginal idea for the ~xehange-rat~ mechanism
was worked out, it waS not intended, or expected , that intra-
margiaal interventions would be so important. Only one rule w.
imposed for such interventions in 1979 : the use of a community
curreacy (aad subseq.uent eligibility for very short-term financ-
ing) requires the prior agreement of the issuing central bank.
The main Community currency of intervention has been the mark,
s~.ce the Bundesbank has agreed to its use for sizeable inter-
ventioas by other central banks. But the bulk of intra-marginal
interventions have been effected in dollars, for no restrictions
whatsoever apply to their use.
In general, the use of the dollar for intra-marginal in-
terventions haa represented no major inconvenience, given the
dollar s strength over most of the period under review and the
sizeable liIalance-of-payments deficits of the EMS countries with
the rest of the world. But it does seem a little odd, for exam-
ple, when the dollar is overvalued , to purchase it in order to
bring pressure to bear on a relatively strong EMS currency 
and, on the other hand, it would be equally illogical , if the
dollar were undervalued , to sell dollars in order to support an
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. EMS currency whose position in the system was weakening. Besi-
des  the effects of interventions in dollars on the position of
an EMS currency in the band are as a rule less pronounced than
those of interventions in Community currencies.
In practice, the management of exchange rates within the
EMS band has been determined by various considerations : main-
taining 4 given exchange Tate against some oth~r participating
currency, protecting domestic money market conditions and inte-
rest rates; and smoothing erratic fluctuations' in the national
currency. These are legitimate aims, but the r~eated interven-
tions they have implied have not always been in the best inte-
rests of coherence in the system.
c) The indicator of divergence
he indicator of divergence was intended to identify de-
" viations and ~licit corrective action, but it ~s no longer ful-
filling its purpose efficiently. It has lost much of its signi-
f icance, and has often f ai lad to give the expected signal for
two main reasons : first, its technical shortcomings, due to the
impossibility of taking full and accurate account of different
weights in the ecu, And of entirely eliminating the influence of
component currencies th4t are not subject to the narrow band;
and secondly, the bias introduced because certain bilateral re-
lations within the system have been considered , in practice,
more important than others. What is more, the call for action
when the divergence threshold is crossed does not carry the same
weight as the one that results from the respect of the bilateral
spreads.
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d) Credit mechanisms
Apart from drawings oq the Very Short Term FClCi lity,
neither of the aystem s other two credit mechanisms, short-term
monetary support and meilium-term financial a.ssistance, has been
used. To some extent, thi. omission may have ~nhanced the finan-
cial credibility of the system. Nevertheless, recourse to these
mechanisms could, in certain casea, have led to the earlier in-
trod~ction of adjustment measures.
e) Changes in central rates : when and how
One of the means of action provided for unde.r the system
is that of changing c.entral rates. Changes, decided by common
accord on the occasion of a realignment and by a procedure that
has gradually emerged, serve to correct the effects of insuffi-
cient convergence. Realignments were supposed to be infrequent
and small : they have in fact been f.irly frequent (there have
been seven), and the agreed changes in bilateral central rates
on occasion ranged from 8 to 10 %. They have not always been
carried out in ideal conditions of calm, because of speculation
in anticipation of sudden breaks in the continuity of exchange
market trends. Experience has shown, however, that under the
present exchange-rate mechanism, speculation can be costly and
has proved not to be a one-way-bet.
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f) T:r:anefers
In Decembe:r: 1978, the Eu:r:opean Council, aware that the
convergence of economic policies and of economic perfo:r:mance
would not be easy to achieve, :r:ecognized the need fo:r: measu:r:es
to etrengthen the economic potential of the less prospe:r:ous
countries of the Community . Those measures took the form of in-
te:r:est-rate subsiaies (200 million ecu a year for five years) on
EIB and NCI loans to finance inf:r:astructu:r:e p:r:ojects. in Italy
and Ireland. The choice of this form of transfer was determined
by the intention to concretely :r:einforce structures in the less
p:r:ospe:r:ous count:r:ies and to :r:econcile pre-existing ambitious
g:r:owth and employment aims with the aim of stability int:r:oduced
by the system. The Council is cu:r::r:ently considering the :r:enewal
of these inte:r:est subsidies, which have made it possible to in-
crease conside:r:ably the volume of Community financing fo:r: Ire-
land and Italy, and thus to funnel a growing share of the Commu-
nity s lending :r:esou:r:ces to those two countries, and to contri-
bute to structural convergence.
B.  The scope of the mechanisms
The EMS does not cove:r: all aspects of monetary relations
of member countries of the Community. It is not yet a complete
system, since there are two Community currencies that do not
participate, and anothe:r: is subject to temporary special arran-
gements. Moreover, there are vast areas of monetAry relations
over which it has no control, that is to say, the external as-
pects af the system and an allied development : the extension of
the private use of the ecu.
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a)  Non-participating currencies and special arrangements
The lira is in a special position in the EMS, because of
the widely divergent inflation rate prevailing in Italy when the
system was s~t up, and the 6 % band has allowed a gradual de-
cline of its exchange rate and protected it from speculation.
However, the Italian autborities have abstained from taking full
advantage of the available margins for competitive purposes,
and have even accepted a gradual rise in the real exchange rate
as a weapon ~n the battle agAinst inflation. On the other hand,
the wider fluctuation band of the lira and its devaluations in
th~ wake of others, have insulated the Italian economy both from
spectacular e~change-rate eriees and from the consequent compul-
sory reappraisal of i ts underlying economic policy stance. In-
deed, it is not inconceivable that, if Italy has been less suc-
cessful in achieving stabili~ation. this is partly because it
. was not subject to such strong EMS pressures to adj ust as the
other participants.
The absence of the pound sterling from the exchange rate
mechanism was probably beneficial for the system at a time when
a fundamental change was taking place in United Kingdom economic
and monetary policy and when the country had to adjust to its
new role as a net oi 1 exporter. Now, however, the absence of
sterling and the drachma is a clear sign that Europe as a mone-
tary unit is ,not coterminous with Europe as an economic unit.
But where sterling is concerned, non-participation is particu-
larly significant : it hampers the EMS is achieving its full po-
tential and reduces the ComJ'llunity s weight in discussions on the
shape of the international monetary system. Moreover, it has ag-
gravated the polarization of the system around a single reserve
currency that now in practice acts as a link between the EMS and
the international monetary system. For sterling' s inclusion, 
~iew of its importance in international monetary relations,
would necessarily have led to a more balanced share o~t of
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responsibilities - and heavy responsibilities they are, as
experience bas shown. The absence of sterling has, moreover,
complicated e~change rate management for EMS countries like
Ireland with particularly close trading and finAncial links with
the united Kingdom. It has also made association with the EMS a
much less attractive proposition for non-Community countries.
b) The system s external relations
The incomplete system and its currency unitl the ecu,
have not proved attractive enough to incite any European country
with particularly close economic and financial ties with the
Communi ty to conclude an agreement with the EMS. Although the
stabilizing influence of the EMS has spread to such countries,
the devaluation of the Swedish Krona in october 1982 drew atten-
tion to the real dangers involved in competitive devaluation in
the immediate monetary environment of the system.
Although the system has no common policy towards major
non-EMS currencies, there h.s been some improvement in the coor-
dination of participants ' policies towards the dollar. Pr~gr~ss
has been made in several areas, some more important than others:
central banks ar~ in touch round the clock to exchange informa-
tion; concerted action has been taken on specific occasions as
part of the day-to- dAY management of e~change markets; and , more
recently, thorough discussions have been held in the appropriate
commi ttees on common approaches in response to actual or fore-
seeable disturbing international developments in interest rates
and exchange rates. All thes~ developments have helped to a
greAter or lesser e~tent to give substance to coordinat~on.
There have been two obstacles to further progress : the US
authorities ' indifference to the exchange rate of the dollar,
and the difference in EMS participants ' situations in relation
to the dollar. The mark has become a reserve currency; the level
yd move~nts of the dollar nave" not, equally a,ffected aU.. the
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member economies, economic and monetary situations vary from one
member State to another, all this obviously complicates the at-
tempt to define the shared view of and attitude to the dollar
that was explicitly called for in the Bremen annex and the Brus-
sels resolution.
c)  An associated development : the private ecu market
The ecu is becoming increasingly popular with private
operators in a role that is quite independent of its role in the
system and the official circuit. The short-term ecu market (in-
terbank market and short-term transactions) is at present estim-
ated at 10 000 million ecu, the volume of long-term issues to-
tals 3 300 million ecu - making the ecu the currency unit with
the third largest share in euro-market borrowing in 1983, out-
standing medium-term syndicated bank credits amount to about
2 000 million ecu.
This may be a promising development both for European
monetary cohesion and for the resistance of the EMS to external
shocks. Freer use of the ecu in commercial and financial opera-
tions in Europe could contribute to convergence, affecting both
interest rates and fin.ancial integration. More extensive inter-
national use of the ecu for invoicing, settlement, borrowing and
investment would also help to reduce the impact of external
shocks, and spread it over the entire .set of Community curren-
cies.
To date, the ecu' s role on the markets has developed
more or less spontaneously, with the varying discreet approval
of the member States. But the ecu market has grown so large that
a more uniform response to market needs is now required of the
member States.
.../...- 18 -
Conclusion
The situation as outlined is not unambiguous and the
assessment must, therefore, be a qualified on~~ The .ost strik-
ing achievement recorded is surely the progress that hAS been
made towards eConomic policy convergence : there is no doubt
that this, recent, progress was made possible by the EMS, which
provided the necessary framework. Achievements to date are, ne-
vertheless, fragile and must be consolidated and broadened but
the requirements imposed by the introduction and operation of
the system h.ave at least given rise to conventions that are now
part and parcel of accepted practice in running it.
On the whole, the mechanisms have worked satisfactorily
even if they have not been used in practice in exactly the way
intended. But this general assessment should not be allowed to
overshadow the fact that certain aspects of the system s func-
tioning have been less than satisfactory. As a reserve asset,
the ecu is very much a second-class instrument; intra-marginal
interventions and their financing lack transparency. The in-
dicator of divergence has shown itself to be deficient. The
scope of the system remains limited, something which has impli-
cations for its internal equilibrium, its solidity and its ex-
ternal aspects. As regards all these points, the review 
broadly similar to that drawn up by the commission two years ago
and on the basis of which it proposed to the Council amendments
regarding in particular the official and private use of the ecu
and certain mechanisms of the exchange rate system.Annex
FIVE YEARS OF MONETARY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Statistical data
1. Month to month exchanqe rate variability.
2. Medium term. real exchange rate variability.
3. Trends in real effective exchange rate/EMS weighting.
4. Evolution of dollar and yen ~gainst the ecu.
5. Changes in money stock : annllcal rat.e and average absolute
variance (averaqe EC and EMS).
6. Changes in consumer prices : annual rate and average absolute
variance (average EC and EMS).
7. Changes in balances of payments on current account, in , of
GDP.1. Month to month exchange rate variability
(average % changes from end month to end month regardless of sign)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1974-78 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1979-83
Against
FFr 1 . 1. 7 1.0
Lit 1.0 1.0
HFl 1.1
Lux
....
$U$ 1. 7
Yen 1.1 3..
1.3
Against all
major currencies
1.8 1.3 1.4
FFr 1.5 1.0 1.8 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.5
Lit 1.9 1.3 1 . 1.3 1.6 1.6
HFl 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.3
Lux 1.0 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.4
$US 1.5 1.3 1.9
Yen 1.8
1. 7 2..Medium term r~al exchantJe rate variabi lity
(maximum % spread around trend)
a) Between EMS currencies
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b)  Against all major currencies
EMS currencies 1979-83
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Other currencies
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